INTRODUCTION
In the original Marxian scheme, governments were the product of the fundamental employer-employee relationships within the society. Supposedly in the capitalist system the primary relationship was one of exploitation and oppression imposed upon the worker by the employer through private ownership of the means of production. The economic enterprise was the institutionalization of that relationship, and according to Lenin, capitalist production was to be identified as a mainstay of imperialism. Hence, for the Soviet ideologue, post-Stalinist economic relations with capitalist business raise grave ideological obstacles. The official party line emphasizes the socialist duty to undermine the capitalist structure and denies basic doctrinal support for Soviet trade and cooperation with imperialist circles. Communist doctrine stipulates that Soviet foreign policy must bring about the world socialist revolution through concerted action against the United States. This is to be manifested in the avoidance of wide-scale cooperation with the United States and its monopolies and in economic competition leading to the "economic defeat" of the imperialist system. The "camp theory" and the doctrine of imperialism theoretically prohibit anything but the most rudimentary commerce between the Soviet and capitalist blocs. Under these theories, the continued existence of imperialism is based on the availability of new markets, resources, and investment opportunities for capitalist enterprise. If allegiance to ideology is to be preserved, the Soviet Union should not contribute to the well-being of this exploitive system by providing new areas for imperialist economic expansion, except under exigent circumstances.
How can this view be reconciled with the ever-expanding trade relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.? A critical matter in the ideological framework is the manner in which the confrontation with capitalism is effectuated. The party theorists now accept that competition must be the prime characteristic of Soviet foreign economic policy, and that the United States and the Soviet Union must be the chief competitors. According to the Soviets, Economic competition between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. occupies the central position in the general progress of struggle by the socialist countries for superiority over the capitalist world in economic affairs. It is also accepted that economic competition will occur in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence. In pure ideological terms, the struggle between the social systems has shifted from military and political confrontation to economic confrontation.' The current era has been characterized as primarily an economic battle between the superpowersO Thus, the imperatives of contemporary communist ideology impose upon the Soviet decision-maker a sense of confrontation and competition with U.S. capitalism, and the course of foreign economic relations in the post-Stalinist era is determined by the policy-maker's allegiance to this dictate. The central difficulty which he faces is to justify the U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade relations in light of the all-pervading mandate of unending competition with the capitalist West. An understanding of the accommodation which has been made requires an analysis of the Soviet interpretation of economic competition and its application to bilateral affairs with the United States.
I FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY BY EXAMPLE
According to contemporary Soviet ideology, economic competition with capitalism refers to the U.S.S.R.'s effort to surpass the United States in economic growth and affluence, as reflected in the various internationally accepted economic indices. It refers to the Soviet effort to outstrip the "citadel of imperialism" in production, labor productivity, and technological advancement. In so doing, the Soviet Union will stand as a model of what man can achieve through socialism, and its example will prod the international revolutionary movement. As L. I. Brezhnev stated to the Fifteenth Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, " [t] he force of example that socialism engenders has always played an important role in the development of the international workers' movement." 4 Economic competition is an effort to demonstrate the "Russian miracle" 5 to the world community. Since peaceful coexistence prohibits military struggle, the world revolution must be produced through non-military means. Internal economic development is one of those means. Soviet Marxism claims that as the people of the world perceive the advantages of socialism, they will turn away from the capitalist system. This will occur sometime after the U.S.S.R. has surpassed the United States in economic growth. Khrushchev believed that the socialist bloc would be victorious in economic competition with capitalism and that eventually the world community would be won over to socialism by the economic progress of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's idea of peaceful competition became the party line of the C.P.S.U. in 1961 at the Twentysecond Party Congress. 7 The First Secretary's program predicted that socialist production levels would quadruple those of the capitalist world by 198o.8 Khrushchev announced that the basic economic task of the U.S.S.R. was "to overtake and outstrip the most developed capitalist countries in per capita output in the briefest possible historical period." 9 In connection with this, he maintained that "to surpass America's level of per capita output is to surpass the highest achievement of capitalism."'" As early as 1957 Khrushchev confidently predicted that the growth of the Soviet Union would outdistance the United States. He said,
In view of the fact that the pace of our industrial growth is considerably more rapid than that of the U.S.A., we can consider the task of outstripping the U.S.A. in peaceful competition in a very short time to be a perfectly real and feasible one.' 1 At that time the Soviet Union still trailed the United States in the production of such vital items as iron ore, pig iron, steel, cement, and wool. During his tenure Khrushchev consistently argued that domestic development was the chief form of international struggle under peaceful coexistence. This idea was first consecrated at the Twenty-first Party Congress in 1959. Supposedly that Congress' decisions outlined a policy of economic competition with the U.S., designed to make the U.S.S.R. the supreme power. imperatives behind Soviet foreign economic policy. The United States was being challenged for world leadership by the Soviet economy, and the campaign for greater economic development was being exhorted to new heights by Soviet ideological desires to defeat world capitalism. The post-Khrushchev leadership has continued the notion that peaceful coexistence demands a comparison between the economic growth rates of the Soviet Union and the United States, but has not gone to the extremes of its predecessor. Currently it asserts that socialist bloc industrial production is seventy per cent of capitalist levels and contends that during the i96o's the U.S.S.R. growth rate was consistently higher than the U.S. rate. ' Soviet figures show a vast Russian improvement through 1971. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, for example, suggests that 1971 demonstrated the "enormous advantage" of socialism over capitalism, because, while the United States was suffering a decline, the Soviet Union had a growth rate of 6.3 per cent.
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The campaign for peaceful competition is an effort to demonstrate advantageous contrasting features of Soviet and American domestic societies. In 1957 the following sentiment appeared in Izvestia:
Our show-windows are perhaps a little poorer, but hardly to a striking extent, and our life is universally recognized as incomparably richer, brighter and fuller, and its immediate prospects decisively outshine everything on the other side.Y 7
The domestic aspect of U.S.-U.S.S.R. peaceful competition was highlighted by Mirovaya Ekonomika in i96i. It reported that "[e]conomic competition between the two systems is ultimately competition for the achievement of the highest labor productivity."' s This brief history indicates that, properly viewed, the Soviet pursuit of economic competition with the United States is primarily an internal Russian effort to reach the United States' production levels.' 9 Therefore, whether or not the effort is a result of ideological directions, its primary support does not come from the sphere of foreign policy. If domestic policy has the side effect of bringing other nations into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union, or if it brings about the diminution of American prestige, then it will achieve extra benefits for the Soviet leadership. The primary goal, however, is an improvement of the domestic situation.
II TE HISTORY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN BILATERAL RELATIONS
The ideological imperatives of Soviet Marxism-Leninism dictate a program of restrained hostility and vigorous competition in foreign economic policy between socialist and capitalist camps. They prohibit cooperative ventures which might provide support for capitalist monopolies or might involve the Soviet Union in entangling alliances with capitalist states. In particular they prohibit close contact between the Soviet government and American business.
Immediately following the Second World War, the Kremlin leadership maintained a strict ideological line. In an attempt to rebuild the U.S.S.R., to buttress Soviet gains in Eastern Europe, and to quarantine the socialist bloc from capitalist influence, Stalin imposed an economic program predicated on attaining autarky. In his work
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USS.R., Stalin suggested that the most important consequence of the war was the disintegration of the world market. The emergence of two social camps following the upheaval produced "two parallel world markets . . . confronting one another." 2 " Stalin predicted that "it [would] soon come to pass that the socialist camp [would] no longer need capitalist imports " ' 2 1 Consequently, trade between the two would come to an end, terminating
Soviet economic support for capitalist enterprise. Stalin's program of autarky produced a number of disadvantageous consequences for the Soviet Union. Not only did it end a necessary stream of Western industrial products, but it closed off a possible market for the developing Soviet productive capacity. By the middle of the i95o's, the U.S.S.R. recognized the overriding advantages of inter-bloc trade, and the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 was the first step toward better economic ties with the West. The Congress sought improved commercial contacts with all the major capitalist states, particularly with the U.S.
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One of the primary tasks of the new Khrushchev regime was to open up the Stalinist economic model to world trade. To achieve this, it was necessary to break down the ideological barriers inherent in Stalin's "two market" theory. Khrushchev began by suggesting that the U.S.S.R. order heavy industrial equipment from capitalist countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany. In a 1958 address to the Soviet chemical industry, he stated: Some comrades might say that it would not be to our advantage to increase orders with the U.S.A., West Germany, Britain and other capitalist countries, that by doing so we would be supporting capitalism. These comrades are wrong.
We stand on Leninist positions and proceed from the fact that we live in a period when there are two systems-the capitalist and the socialist-and economic ties between them can develop on a mutually advantageous basis.
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Other members of the leadership also attacked Stalin's economic scheme. In March of 1958 Pravda and Izvestia reported the following incident.
[At a meeting of voters] A. I. Mikoyan criticized some economists who reason as follows: Since we say that the world market has split into two markets, we can no longer speak of unity of the two world markets; there is no world economy and there are no world prices. These economist comrades evidently have forgotten that unity is not identity, but there is a unity of opposites, and in the given case, of antagonistic opposites. But it is unity nonetheless. Their reasoning essentially contradicts the Leninist principle of the coexistence of the two systems.
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These attacks upon the "two market" theory had one major goal: to eliminate the ideological shackles imposed on Soviet commerce with the capitalist West. Elements of economic cooperation between ideological adversaries were allowed to find a legitimate and integral place in the process of peaceful coexistence. Cooperation in this case meant collaboration with private capitalist firms-a violation of the ideological imperatives.
In the contemporary Soviet lexicon, peaceful coexistence implies internal economic "competition" with capitalism and international economic cooperation with the major capitalist nation, the United States. Following the Twentieth Party Congress the Kremlin made a strong effort to enlarge the trade volume between the superpowers. In particular, Russian imports of American goods rose rapidly after 19543° Table I gives the relevant quantities of heavy machinery imported from the United States, according to Soviet figures. From the ideological viewpoint, the importation of materials in the heavy industrial sector raised the greatest difficulty. It was in this particular area that Stalin hoped to make the socialist camp self-sufficient. The production of heavy industry materials is supposed to be one of the prime supports of the capitalist system. Consequently, Soviet purchases of these commodities amount to a subsidization of the imperialist structure. The other primary type of Soviet-American trade under Khrushchev was agricultural. In particular, 1964 witnessed a huge grain purchase by the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin bought nearly two million tons of grain at a cost of io9 million rubles. It also contracted for 55,000 tons of rice 3 2 However, agricultural transactions were unique occurrences, not meant to reflect any general policy decision. They constituted a Soviet effort to fill a chronic domestic need for grain. Thus, these purchases did not relate to the ideological issue per se, and were, perhaps, further examples of the priority of Soviet national interest over ideology. The fulfillment of internal demand was visualized as a stronger imperative than those limiting commerce with the "citadel of imperialism." Khrushchev's efforts indicate that the obstacles to increased Soviet-American trade were not ideological in origin. Once Stalin's concept of two world markets was eliminated, the path was open to improved economic relations with the United States. However, during Khrushchev's tenure, despite the examples cited above, there was no mammoth increase in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade volume. The reason for the disparity between Soviet desires and actual performance was not ideology but rather American restrictions on trade with communist countries. The United States government prohibited commercial transactions with the Soviet Union on most " Soviet imports of American products began to exceed exports in 196o. It should be remembered, however, that Soviet exports to the United States were greatly affected by heavy American import restrictions on Russian goods. Beyond trade, the current leadership has sought American investment in the Soviet economy. According to one Western writer, "The Soviet economy isn't producing either the technology or the capital investment funds needed to move the U.S.S.R. into superpower status." 36 Therefore, the Kremlin has argued that the scientific-technical revolution makes possible and necessary U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the development of the Russian economic sector. According to the Soviets, there is presently a need to select the most rational forms of cooperation, such as the joint development of Soviet natural resources." In this endeavor, "American corporations would be suitable and interested parties."
38 American banks also could participate in the process.
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In G. Arbatov's view the Cold War of the i96o's was the chief obstacle to extensive cooperation.
4 " With the easing of political tensions in recent years, economic partnership became feasible, not only in the utilization of natural resources but also in the construction of Soviet industrial enterprises and in technical research.' The conclusion of the Cold War ushered in a Soviet effort to import American technology and management sciences; and the current period has witnessed increasing the Soviet Union and the Satra Corporation, which represented all the American firms, created more than a sixty per cent increase in Soviet-U.S. trade levels. The U.S.S.R. purchased 65 million dollars in equipment, much of it for mining and petroleum production. In return, the Soviets sold the firms 6o million dollars worth of non-ferrous metals-copper, zinc, and lead 6
The post-Khrushchev elite has sought closer economic cooperation with U.S. capitalism and has ignored ideological imperatives. It has done this in order to correct its balance of payments position with the United States. Further, it has sought the advantages of U.S. technology and investment capital for its own internal economic development. Finally, the current U.S.S.R. leadership looks upon stable economic ties and close cooperation as essential elements in the process of d&ente and as useful instruments for the resolution of various international difficulties.
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The easing of tensions and the improvement of economic relations are seen as mutually-assisting factors. On the one hand, as political controversy subsides, cooperation becomes less objectionable to the protagonists and new contacts develop. A case in point was the opening of new air routes needed for commerce between Moscow and New York'
The relaxation in Soviet-American political relations encouraged these contacts. On the other hand, the settlement of economic issues can contribute to the settlement of political problems. The fishing agreements signed To summarize, the Soviet Union since 1964 has sought cooperative economic relations with the United States for -three reasons: (i) to correct its balance of payments situation with Washington, (2) to import American technology and investment capital for the development of the Soviet economy, and (3) to strengthen and expand the process of d~tente begun in the period of peaceful coexistence. None of these motives has ideological origins. Each outiines a course of action contrary to the imperatives of the current ideology. As indicated earlier, orthodox Marxism-Leninism espouses a course of non-cooperation and economic restraint in Soviet-American relations. Indeed, following the Second World War the Stalinist program of autarky coincided with these doctrinal demands. Only after Stalin's death and the change in requirements of Soviet national interest did the Kremlin leadership move toward cooperation. Peaceful coexistence in U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral economic relations has meant the rejection of ideology in the policy process. In particular, as Cold War tensions have diminished and Soviet internal economic needs have expanded, the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny regime has ignored the postulated ideological restraints on contacts with capitalist circles and has moved to meet the requirements of the Soviet state.
III THE SUMMIT AND THE FUTURE OF SOvIET-AMERIcAN ECONOMic RELATIONS
A major landmark in the movement toward bilateral cooperation was the 1972 Moscow summit. In the months preceding President Nixon's arrival in the U.S.S.R. the Soviet press indicated that economic trade and cooperation were prime topics for discussion. According to the Kremlin, the only obstacles to improved commercial relations were the arbitrary discriminatory barriers maintained by the U.S. against Soviet goods. If reciprocity and economic equality could be recognized in the summit agreements, then both states could expand trade., 50 In the negotiations both sides sought specific goals. The United States wanted any trade agreement to be comprehensive and include a resolution of the U.S.S.R.'s World War II lend-lease debt and provisions to assist and protect American business operating in Russia. The Soviet Union sought above all else a grant of most-favored- nation status which would end the twenty-two-year-old American discrimination against the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin also desired long-term credits for its purchases. The achievement of these goals would have been understood in the Kremlin as U.S. recognition of mutual trading equality.
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While significant progress toward a trade accord was made, the summit talks did not produce a final document. The only formal result was the creation of a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission to continue the discussions and make proposals. Beyond this, the two countries' leaders made economic cooperation an element of the mutually-recognized concept of peaceful coexistence. The seventh point of the "Basic Principles" signed in Moscow stated, The U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.
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While the discussions did not result in a comprehensive accord at the time, it was clear that the Soviets seriously sought economic ties. Shortly after the summit, the U.S.S.R. negotiated comprehensive contracts with a number of U.S. firms. The most important of these was an accord with the Occidental Petroleum Corporation signed on July 14, 1972 . Under a five-year agreement the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers obtained Occidental's assistance in the extraction and processing of oil and gas, in the production of agricultural fertilizers and chemicals, in the treatment of metals and plating, in the design and construction of hotels, and in the utilization of solid wastes. 53 Observers indicated that the trade package could be worth 3 billion dollars with Occidental receiving compensation in the form of gas, oil, and other raw materials (nickel, chromium, etc.) . In particular, the American company would assist the Kremlin in the development of the Tyumen gas fields in Siberia. 54 This venture could also include Japanese investment. 5 In' other transactions the U.S.S.R. contracted with a number of firms to assist in the development of the Soviet Union's new Kama River Tractor Plant. Moscow granted Gulf-Western a contract to supply a production line for the complex. 6 The Thermo Electron Corporation received an "L Known as the North Star Project, the extraction of gas from the Tyumen region will also include the participation of the Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Tenneco, and Brown and Root. These U.S. companies will be involved in transporting the gas to Murmansk, liquifying it, and shipping it to the United States. H. HumPnREY & H. REuss, JoiNT EcONoMuc Commas., 93D CONG., Isr SEss., OBSERVATIONS ON EAsr-WEsT ECoNosne iRLATIONS: U.S.S.R. AND POLAND 4 (Comm. Print 1973).
order for twenty-two industrial furnaces.17 In all, the Kremlin contemplated i billion dollars in U.S. purchases for industry.
In order to finance these new economic projects the Soviets have sought two types of Western credits: short-term deferred payment credits which would be related to specific purchases, and long-term "project loans" for internal investment purposes. To achieve both forms of financing during 1972, the Soviet Union commenced discussions with several U.S. and West European banks. To establish a credit rating, the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, the Moscow-based banking institution for the socialist economic bloc (CEMA), borrowed 140 million dollars during the first half of 1972. Finally, in November of that year the Kremlin permitted the Chase Manhattan Bank to open a Moscow branch, 5 8 These measures cleared the way for steady progress toward closer U.S.-Soviet commercial ties. On October 18, 1972, a comprehensive economic agreement was reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. 5 9 The accord called for a "new era of commercial friendship," and it essentially fulfilled both sides' goals discussed during the summit talks. Article I granted the U.S.S.R. the most-favored-nation status it sought and established reciprocity and equality as the foundation of the accord. The threeyear agreement called for tripling of trade to the level of 1.5 billion dollars. The U.S. would export machine tools, heavy industry equipment, consumer goods, and grain products. In return the United States would receive Soviet natural resources. Significantly, the U.S.S.R. would have a right to long-term export-import credits, and the United States would receive repayment of the long-standing lend-lease debt in the amount of 722 million dollars. It would also continue, for the time being, its favorable trade balance at a ratio of three to one.
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In spite of the October agreement, however, and in spite of individual cases of Soviet-American corporation contracts, the prospects for Soviet-U.S. economic relations remains somewhat restricted. While the potential exists for trade to increase rapidly, various obstacles limit the possibilities. First, in order to obtain complex and sophisticated American goods, the Soviet Union will have to offer in return items which US. enterprises demand. Except for foreign exchange and natural resources, the Soviet economy has little that is attractive to the American buyer. Second, "Soviet-United States commercial relations which have begun to expand rapidly will level off again or be set back unless large-scale joint ventures in gas, oil and other raw materials are worked out." 1 U.S. corporations will not enter these cooperative projects unless they have on-site inspection rights and they perceive their natural resource development investments as good growth prospects.
2 Since this amounts to an inflow of finance capital, the Kremlin must be concerned about strengthening the imperialist system through these projects. There is also a question as to the potential size of U.S.-Soviet natural resource trade. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, "It will be a number of years before the dollar volume of our Soviet trade amounts even to a few per cent of our total consumption, even in those raw material and energy areas where we expect our heaviest import concentrations." 6 3 Much will depend on possible future supplies from the Middle East and newly discovered Alaskan deposits. If U.S. concerns are able to fill their requirements more cheaply and efficiently from these regions, then they will not have to rely on the U.S.S.R.'s reserves. Furthermore, Soviet quantities are not unlimited. With increasing socialist bloc needs, Japanese requirements, and contracted supplies to Europe by way of the Siberian-Bavarian pipeline, the prospects for fulfilling the American requirements in the near future seem slim. Finally, until Soviet currency is fully convertible, the price structures and economies of the two states will restrict the limits of mutually advantageous trade. Inevitable internal economic disruptions will result which each government will have to alleviate. Until Soviet products are allowed to find their own price on the world market, U.S. firms will be leary of contractual arrangements.
CONCLUSION
While future prospects for trade between the Soviet Union and the United States remain clouded, it is important to note that the present obstacles are non-ideological in nature. The primary difficulties are American reservations and Soviet noncapability to deliver goods. Direct economic relations between the leaders of socialism and capitalism exhibit little evidence of Soviet ideological influence. The growing Soviet need for American technology and investment, and the desire for a consistent policy of d4tente have overridden the ideological imperatives which prohibit wide-scale cooperation with imperialist monopolies and demand resolute Soviet action to bring about the world socialist revolution. In their place, peaceful coexistence has imposed a program aimed at filling the Soviet state's economic needs based on the principles of equality and reciprocity regardless of Marxist-Leninist prescriptions.
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